National security in Somalia was shaped by the country’s pursuit of Greater Somalia and its conflict with neighboring states. For much of its modern history, Somalia sought to unite all Somali-inhabited territories in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti. This ambition culminated in the Ogaden War of 1977–78, when Somali forces, alongside separatist guerrillas, invaded Ethiopia. Initially successful, Somalia was soon overwhelmed when the Soviet Union and Cuba intervened on Ethiopia’s behalf. The defeat not only dashed Somalia’s hopes of annexing the Ogaden but also left the country militarily weakened, politically humiliated, and fearful of Ethiopian retaliation.
The armed forces played a central role in Somali national life, both as symbols of unity and as instruments of political power. By the early 1980s, the Somali National Army numbered about 50,000 troops. It was organized into infantry, mechanized, artillery, and commando units, though its equipment was poorly maintained. The Air Force, with around 1,000 personnel, possessed some combat aircraft, but many were grounded for lack of spare parts. The Navy, with roughly 550 sailors, had a handful of coastal patrol vessels, most of them in poor condition. Although the army had once been seen as the strongest institution in the state, its poor performance in the Ogaden War revealed serious weaknesses in training, logistics, and leadership.
Foreign military aid was critical to Somalia’s defense. Until 1977, the Soviet Union was the country’s principal supplier of weapons, training, and advisers. After the rift with Moscow, Somalia turned to other partners, including China, Egypt, Italy, the United States, and wealthy Arab states. These relationships provided limited quantities of new equipment, but nowhere near the scale of Soviet support previously enjoyed.
Security concerns after the Ogaden War shifted inward. Defeat had damaged the regime’s credibility, and opposition movements began to gain momentum, both at home and abroad. To counter this, Siad Barre relied heavily on state security forces. The Somali Police Force, numbering about 8,000 officers, maintained basic law and order. The People’s Militia, also called the Victory Pioneers, acted as police auxiliaries, political organizers, and military reserves. More important was the National Security Service (NSS), an intelligence organization directly controlled by the president. The NSS monitored political opponents, repressed dissent, and cultivated an atmosphere of fear. The prison system became an extension of political control, with widespread reports of human rights abuses.
By the early 1980s, Somalia’s national security rested on fragile foundations. The dream of Greater Somalia had led to war and defeat, while dependence on foreign aid left the military vulnerable to shifting international alliances. Internally, Siad Barre’s regime relied increasingly on repression to maintain control. The armed forces, once a source of national pride, had been weakened, and the country faced both external threats from Ethiopia and internal opposition from disaffected clans and political movements.